A 2-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme allows a user to retrieve the ith bit of an n-bit database replicated among two noncommunicating servers, while not revealing any information about i to either server. In this work, we construct a 2-server PIR scheme with total communication cost n O log log n log n . This improves over current 2-server protocols, which all require (n 1/3 ) communication. Our construction circumvents the n 1/3 barrier of Razborov and Yekhanin [2007], which holds for the restricted model of bilinear group-based schemes (covering all previous 2-server schemes). The improvement comes from reducing the number of servers in existing protocols, based on Matching Vector Codes, from 3 or 4 servers to 2. This is achieved by viewing these protocols in an algebraic way (using polynomial interpolation) and extending them using partial derivatives.
INTRODUCTION
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was first introduced by Chor et al. [1998] . In a k-server PIR scheme, a user can retrieve the ith bit a i of an n-bit database a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n replicated among k servers (which do not communicate) while giving no information about i to any server. The goal is to design PIR schemes that minimize the communication cost defined as the worst-case number of bits transferred between the user and the servers in the protocol. The trivial solution that works even with one server is to make a server send the entire database a to the user, which has communication cost n.
When k = 1, the trivial solution cannot be improved [Chor et al. 1998 ]. However, when k ≥ 2, the communication cost can be brought down significantly. In Chor et al. [1998] , a 2-server PIR scheme with communication cost O(n 1/3 ) and a k-server PIR scheme with cost O(k 2 log(k) · n 1/k ) are presented. The k-server PIR schemes have been improved further in subsequent papers [Ambainis 1997; Beimel and Ishai 2001; Beimel et al. 2002] . In Beimel et al. [2002] , a k-server PIR scheme with cost n O( log log k k log k ) is obtained. Then, in a breakthrough result of Yekhanin [2008] , the first 3-server scheme with subpolynomial communication is given (assuming a number theoretic conjecture). Efremenko [2012] presents an unconditional k-server PIR scheme with subpolynomial cost for k ≥ 3, which is slightly improvedin Itoh and Suzuki [2010] and Chee et al. [2013] . These new PIR schemes follow from the constructions of constant query smooth Locally Decodable Codes (LDCs) of subexponential length called Matching Vector Codes (MVCs). A k-query LDC [Katz and Trevisan 2000] is an error-correcting code that allows the receiver of a corrupted encoding of a message to recover the ith bit of the message using only k (random) queries. In a smooth LDC, each query of the reconstruction algorithm is uniformly distributed among the code word symbols. Given a k-query smooth LDC, one can construct a k-server PIR scheme by letting each server simulate one of the queries. For more information on the relation between PIR and LDCs, we refer to the survey [Yekhanin 2012] .
Despite the advances in 3-server PIR schemes, the 2-server PIR case remained stuck at O(n 1/3 ) communication. An explanation for the apparent n 1/3 barrier for 2-server PIR is given by Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] who proved an (n 1/3 ) lower bound for a restricted model of 2-server PIR called bilinear group based PIR, which contains all previously known constructions. This is in stark contrast to the best-known 5 log n lower bound for general PIR schemes [Wehner and de Wolf 2005] . We elaborate more on the relation between this model and our construction after we present our results.
PIR is extensively studied and there are several variants of PIR in literature. The most important variant with cryptographic applications is called Computationally Private Information Retrieval (CPIR). In CPIR, the privacy guarantee is based on computational hardness of certain functions, that is, a computationally bounded server cannot gain any information about the user's query. In this case, nontrivial schemes exist even in the case of one server under some cryptographic hardness assumptions. For more information on these variants of PIR, see Gasarch [2004] and Ostrovsky and Skeith III [2007] . In this article, we are concerned only with information theoretic privacy, that is, even a computationally unbounded server cannot gain any information about the user's query, which is the strongest form of privacy.
Our Results
We start with a formal definition of a 2-server PIR scheme. A 2-server PIR scheme involves two servers S 1 and S 2 and a user U. A database a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n is replicated between the servers S 1 and S 2 . We assume that the servers cannot communicate with each other. The user U wants to retrieve the ith bit of the database a i without revealing any information about i to either server. The following definition is from Chor et al. [1998] : Definition 1.1. A 2-server PIR protocol is a triplet of algorithms P = (Q, A, R). At the beginning of the protocol, the user U obtains a uniformly random string r. Next, U invokes Q(i, r) to generate a pair of queries (q 1 , q 2 ). U sends q 1 to S 1 and q 2 to S 2 . Each server S j responds with an answer ans j = A( j, a, q j ). Finally, U computes its output by applying the recovery algorithm R(ans 1 , ans 2 , i, r). The protocol should satisfy the following conditions:
-Correctness: For any n, a ∈ {0, 1} n and i ∈ [n], the user outputs the correct value of a i with probability 1 (where the probability is over random strings r), that is, R(ans 1 , ans 2 , i, r) = a i . -Privacy: Each server learns no information about i. That is, for any fixed database a and for j = 1, 2, the distributions of q j (i 1 , r) and q j (i 2 , r) are identical for all i 1 , i 2 ∈ [n] when r is randomly chosen.
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The communication cost of the protocol is the total number of bits exchanged between the user and the servers in the worst case.
k-server PIR is similarly defined, with the database replicated among k servers that cannot communicate between themselves. We defined only 1-round PIR, that is, there is only one round of interaction between the user and the servers. All known constructions of PIR schemes are 1 round; it is an interesting open problem to determine if interaction helps. We now state our main theorem: THEOREM 1.2. There exists a 2-server PIR scheme with communication cost n O( log log n log n ) .
In Efremenko [2012] , a 2 r -server PIR scheme was given with n O((log log n/log n)
1−1/r ) communication cost for any r ≥ 2. Using our techniques, we can reduce the number of servers in this scheme by a factor of two. That is, we prove the following stronger form of Theorem 1.2. Other than the dramatic improvement for the 2-server case, Theorem 1.3 also gives a more modest improvement over known results in a particular range of the parameters. The 2 r query complexity of MVCs in Efremenko [2012] was reduced to 9 · 2 r−4 for r ≥ 6 in Itoh and Suzuki [2010] while keeping the encoding length the same. This was improved in Chee et al. [2013] to 3 r/2 for 2 ≤ r ≤ 103 and ( 3 4 ) 51 · 2 r for r ≥ 104. Using these LDCs directly to get a PIR scheme is better than our scheme when the number of servers is more than 26; our scheme is better than these when the number of servers are less than 9.
Related Work
Lower Bounds for Bilinear Group-Based PIR. In Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] , an (n 1/3 ) lower bound was shown for a restricted model of 2-server PIR schemes. This lower bound holds for schemes that are both bilinear and group based. Our scheme can be made into a bilinear scheme (see Section 4.1) over the field F 3 of three elements (our scheme can, in fact, be made linear and, using a simple transformation given in Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] , any linear scheme can be converted to a bilinear scheme). However, it does not satisfy the property of being group based as defined in Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] . Our scheme does satisfy a weaker notion of employing a group-based secret sharing scheme (another technical term defined in Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] ). The difference between these two notions (of being group based as opposed to employing a group-based secret sharing scheme) is akin to the difference between Locally Correctable Codes (LCCs) and LDCs (LCCs being the stronger notion). In group-based PIR, the database is represented by the values of a function over a subset of a group, but the user should be able to recover the value of that function at every group element. Our scheme encodes the database as a function over a group; the user will only be able to recover the bits of the database from the function.
2-Query LDCs
Over Large Alphabet. The reader familiar with the exponential lower bounds for 2-query LDCs [Kerenidis and de Wolf 2003] would wonder why our construction does not violate these bounds. The reason is that, when one translates 2-server PIR schemes into LDC, the resulting alphabet of the code can be quite large. Formally, a scheme with communication cost s will translate into an LDC C :
(with the blocks corresponding to all possible answers by the servers). Thus, each one of the two queries used by the decoder is a string of s bits. The known lower bounds for such LDCs are exponential only as long as the block length s << log(n); therefore, our construction does not violate them. Thus, our main theorem also gives the first construction of a subexponential 2-query LDC over an alphabet of size 2 n o(1) .
Proof Overview
On a very high level, the new protocol combines the existing 2-server scheme of Woodruff and Yekhanin [2005] , which uses polynomial interpolation using derivatives, with MVCs [Yekhanin 2008; Efremenko 2012] . In particular, we make use of the view of MVCs as polynomial codes, developed in Dvir et al. [2011] . This short overview is meant as a guide to the ideas in the construction (a detailed description will follow in the next sections). The 2-server scheme of Woodruff and Yekhanin [2005] works by embedding the database a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) as evaluations of a degree 3 polynomial
, with k ∼ n 1/3 and F q a finite field. To recover the value a i = F(P i ), the user passes a random line through the point P i , picks two random points Q 1 , Q 2 on that line, and sends the point Q j to the jth server. Each server responds with the value of F at Q j and the values of all partial derivatives ∂ F/∂ x , = 1, . . . , k at that point. The restriction of F to the line is a univariate degree 3 polynomial; the user can recover the values of this polynomial at two points as well as the value of its derivative at these points. These four values (two evaluations plus two derivatives) are enough to recover the polynomial and thus its value at P i . The user can compute the derivatives of the restricted polynomial from the partial derivatives of F (knowing the line equation) using the chain rule. The protocol is private since each query Q j is uniformly distributed in F k q and thus independent of i. We now describe the PIR schemes of Yekhanin [2008] and Efremenko [2012] , which are based on MV families. An MV family is a pair of lists [Grolmusz 1999 ] (this is impossible if m is prime). From such a family, we can construct an m-server PIR scheme as follows: given a message a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , define the polynomial
. We think of F as a polynomial with coefficients in some finite field F q containing an element γ ∈ F q of order m.
To recover a i , the user picks a random z ∈ Z k m and considers the restriction of F to the "multiplicative line" given by L = {γ
In Dvir et al. [2011] it was observed that this restriction can be seen as a polynomial g(T ) of degree at most m − 1 in the new "variable" T = γ t , thus can be reconstructed from the m values on the line
is a nonzero multiple of a i (since the only contribution to the free coefficient comes from the monomial a i x u i ); thus, we can recover it if we know g(T ). Therefore, the user can recover a i by asking the tth (t = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1) server for the value G(t) = F(γ z+tv i ), which requires sending the uniformly random point z + tv i to the server. The communication cost is O(k) = n o (1) due to the super-polynomial size of the MV family.
Our protocol extends the MV-based protocol by asking each server for the evaluations of F at a point, as well as the values of a certain differential operator (similar to firstorder derivatives). For this to work, we need two ingredients. The first is to replace the field F q with a certain ring that has characteristic m and an element of order m (we only use m = 6 and can take the polynomial ring Z m [γ ]/(γ 6 − 1)). The second is an observation that, in known MV-family constructions [Grolmusz 1999 ], the inner products u i , v j that are nonzero (that is, when i = j) can be made to fall in a small set. More precisely, over Z 6 , the inner products are either zero or in the set {1, 3, 4}.
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This means that the restricted polynomial has only nonzero coefficients corresponding to powers of T coming from the set {0, 1, 3, 4}. Such a polynomial has four degrees of freedom and can be recovered from two evaluations and two derivatives (of order one). We are also able to work with arbitrary MV families by using derivatives up to the second order at two points (which are sufficient to recover a degree 5 polynomial; see Appendix 6).
Organization
In Section 2, we give some preliminary definitions and notations. In Section 3, we review the construction of a 2-server PIR scheme with O(n 1/3 ) communication cost, which is based on polynomial interpolation with partial derivatives [Woodruff and Yekhanin 2005] . In Section 4, we present our new 2-server scheme and prove Theorem 1.2. The proof of Theorem 1.3 is given in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with some remarks on future directions.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. We will use bold letters, such as x, u, v, z, to denote vectors. The inner product between two vectors u = (u 1 , . . . ,
For a commutative ring, R we will denote by R[x 1 , . . . , x k ] the ring of polynomials in formal variables x 1 , . . . , x k with coefficients in R. We will use the notation x z with
k is the unique vector such that u ≡ũ mod m. F q denotes the finite field of size q.
The Rings R m,r
For our construction, it will be convenient (although not absolutely necessary; see Section 4.1) to work over a ring that has characteristic 6 and contains an element of order 6. We now discuss how to construct such a ring in general.
Let m > 1 be an integer and let γ be a formal variable. We denote by
the ring of univariate polynomials Z m [γ ] in γ with coefficients in Z m modulo the identity γ r = 1. More formally, each element f ∈ R m,r is represented by a degree ≤ r − 1 polynomial f (γ ) = r−1 =0 c γ with coefficients c ∈ Z m . Addition is done as in Z m [γ ] (coordinate wise modulo m) and multiplication is done over Z m [γ ] but using the identity γ r = 1 to reduce higher-order monomials to degree ≤ r − 1. It is easy to see that this reduction is uniquely defined: to obtain the coefficient of γ we sum all the coefficients of powers of γ that are of the form + kr for some integer k ≥ 0. This implies the following lemma. Remark 2.2. For any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}, γ t is not a zero divisor in the ring R m,r . This holds since the coefficients of γ t · f (γ ) are the same as those of f (γ ) (shifted cyclically t positions).
The rings R m,r are sometimes denoted by Z m [C r ] and referred to as the group ring of the cyclic group C r with coefficients in Z m . See, for example, Kahrobaei et al. [2013] and Hurley and Hurley [2011] for some recent applications of these rings in cryptography. 
Matrices Over Commutative Rings
Let R be a commutative ring (with unity). Let M ∈ R n×n be an n× n matrix with entries from R. Most of the classical theory of determinants can be derived in this setting in exactly the same way as over fields. One particularly useful piece of this theory is the adjugate (or classical adjoint) matrix. For an n × n matrix M ∈ R n×n , the adjugate matrix is denoted by adj(M) ∈ R n×n and has the ( j, i)-cofactor of A as its (i, j)th entry (recall that the (i, j)-cofactor is the determinant of the matrix obtained from M after removing the ith row and jth column multiplied by (−1) i+ j ). A basic fact in matrix theory is the following identity. The way we will use this fact is as follows:
Remark 2.4. Suppose that M ∈ R n×n has nonzero determinant and let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) t ∈ R n be some column vector, where a 1 = 0 or a 1 = c and c is not a zero-divisor. Then, we can determine the value of a 1 (i.e., tell whether it is 0 or c) from the product M · a. The way to do it is to multiply M · a from the left by adj(M) and to look at the first entry. This will give us det(M) · a 1 , which is zero if and only if a 1 is zero (since det(M) · c is always nonzero).
Matching Vector Families
Definition 2.5 (Matching Vector Family). Let S ⊂ Z m \{0} and let F = (U, V), where
If S is omitted, it implies that S = Z m \{0}. Remark 2.7. The size of S in this theorem is 2 r − 1 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Thus, there are matching vector families of super-polynomial size in the dimension of the space with inner products restricted to a set of size 2 r = |S ∪ {0}|.
In the special case in which p 1 = 2, p 2 = 3, we have that m = 6 and the following corollary: COROLLARY 2.8. There is an explicitly constructible S-matching vector family F in Z k 6 of size n ≥ exp( ( (log k) 2 log log k )), where S = {1, 3, 4} ⊂ Z 6 .
REVIEW OF O(n 1/3 ) COST 2-SERVER PIR
There are several known constructions of 2-server PIR with O(n 1/3 ) communication cost. We will recall here in detail a particular construction by Woodruff and Yekhanin [2005] that employs polynomial interpolation using derivatives (over a field). In the next section, we will replace the field with a ring and see how to use matching vector families to reduce the communication cost.
Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) be the database, and choose k to be the smallest integer such that n ≤ k 3 . Let F q be a finite field with q > 3 elements. Let φ : [n] → {0, 1} k ⊂ F k q be an embedding of the n coordinates into points in {0, 1} k of Hamming weight 3. Such an embedding exists since n ≤ k 3 . Define F(x 1 , . . . ,
Note that F(x) is a degree 3 polynomial satisfying F(φ(i))
. Fix any two nonzero field elements t 1 = t 2 ∈ F q \{0}.
Suppose that the user U wants to recover the bit a τ . The protocol is as follows: The user picks a uniformly random element z ∈ F k q and sends φ(τ ) + t 1 z to S 1 and φ(τ ) + t 2 z to S 2 . Each server S i then replies with the value of F at the point received F(φ(τ ) + t i z) as well as the values of the k partial derivatives of F at the same point
The partial derivatives here are defined in the same way as for polynomials over the real numbers.
The protocol is private since φ(τ ) + tz is uniformly distributed in F k q for any τ and t = 0. Consider the univariate polynomial
Observe that, by the chain rule,
Thus, the user can recover the values g(t), g (t) for t = t 1 , t 2 from the server's responses. From this information, the user needs to find g(0) = F(φ(τ )) = a τ . Since F is a degree 3 polynomial, g(t) is a univariate degree 3 polynomial, let g(t) = 3 =0 c t . Therefore, we have the following matrix equation:
The matrix M has determinant det(M) = (t 2 − t 1 ) 4 ; thus, M is invertible as long as t 1 = t 2 . Therefore, the user can find c 0 = g(0) = F(φ(τ )) = a τ by multiplying by the inverse of M.
The communication cost of this protocol is O(k) = O(n 1/3 ) since the user sends a vector in F k q to each server and each server sends an element in F q and a vector in F k q to the user. In this section, we describe our main construction, which proves Theorem 1.2. Before describing the construction, we set up some of the required ingredients and notations. The first ingredient is a matching vector family over Z 6 , as in Corollary 2.8. That is, we construct an S = {1, 3, 4}-matching vector family F = (U, V), where U = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) have elements in Z k 6 . Corollary 2.8 tells us that this can be done with n = exp( (log 2 k/ log log k)) or k = exp(O( log n log log n)). We will work with polynomials over the ring
(see Section 2). We will denote the vector (γ
6 . We will need to extend the notion of partial derivatives to polynomials in  R[x 1 , . . . , x k ]. This will be a nonstandard definition, but it will satisfy all the properties that we will need. Instead of defining each partial derivative separately, we define one operator that will include all of them.
Definition 4.1. Let R be a commutative ring and let
For example, when F(
2 (with integer coefficients),
One can think of F (1) both as a polynomial with coefficients in R k and a k-tuple of polynomials in R[x 1 , . . . , x k ]. This will not matter much since the only operation that we will perform on F (1) is to evaluate it at a point in R k .
The Protocol. Let a = (a 1 , a 2 . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n be an n-bit database shared by two servers S 1 and S 2 . The user U wants to find the bit a τ without revealing any information about τ to either server. For the rest of this section, R = R 6,6 = Z 6 [γ ]/(γ 6 − 1). The servers represent the database as a polynomial
where U = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are given by the matching vector family F = (U, V). The user samples a uniformly random z ∈ Z k 6 , then sends z + t 1 v τ to S 1 and z + t 2 v τ to S 2 , where we fix t 1 = 0 and t 2 = 1 (other choices of values would also work). S i then responds with the value of F at the point γ z+t i v τ , that is, with F(γ z+t i v τ ) and the value of the first-order derivative at the same point F
(1) (γ z+t i v τ ). Note that the protocol is private since z + tv τ is uniformly distributed over Z k 6 for any fixed τ and t.
U : Picks a uniformly random z ∈ Z
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Recovery. Define
Using the fact that γ 6 = 1, we can rewrite G(t) as
with each c ∈ R given by
we can conclude that c 0 = a τ γ u τ ,z and c 2 = c 5 = 0. Therefore,
Next, consider the polynomial
By definition, we have that
where the last equality holds since
Thus, the user can find the values of g(γ t ), g (1) (γ t ) for t = t 1 , t 2 . Since t 1 = 0, t 2 = 1, we obtain the following matrix equation:
The determinant (over R) of the matrix M is
thus, by Lemma 2.1, is a nonzero element of the ring R. Using the ring R 6,6 = Z 6 [γ ]/(γ 6 − 1) in this construction makes the presentation clearer but is not absolutely necessary. Observing the proof, we see that one can replace it with any ring R as long as there is a homomorphism from R 6,6 to R such that the determinant of the matrix M (Equation (2)) does not vanish under this homomorphism.
For example, we can work over the ring Z 6 and use the element −1 as a substitute for γ . Since (−1) 6 = 1, all of the calculations that we did with γ carry through. In addition, the resulting determinant of M is nonzero when setting γ = −1; thus, we can complete the recovery process. More formally, define the homomorphism τ : Z 6 [γ ]/(γ 6 − 1) → Z 6 by extending the identity homomorphism on Z 6 using τ (γ ) = −1. Observe that the determinant of the matrix M in Equation (2) does not vanish under this homomorphism, τ (det(M)) = −4 = 2.
A more interesting example is the ring of integers modulo 3, which we denote by F 3 to highlight that it is also a field. We can use the homomorphism φ : Z 6 [γ ]/(γ 6 − 1) → F 3 by extending the natural homomorphism from Z 6 to F 3 (given by reducing each element modulo 3) using φ(γ ) = −1. Again, the determinant in Equation (2) does not vanish. This also shows that our scheme can be made to be bilinear, as defined in Razborov and Yekhanin [2007] , since the answers of each server become linear combinations of database entries over a field and the recovered bit is also a linear combination of the answers of each server.
AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION
In the construction of Section 4, we used the special properties of Grolmusz's construction, namely, that the nonzero inner products are in the special set S = {1, 3, 4}. Here, we show how to make the construction work with any matching vector family (over Z 6 ). This construction also introduces higher-order differential operators, which could be of use to generalize this work further.
Suppose that we run our protocol (with R = R 6,6 ) using a matching vector family with S = Z 6 \{0}. Then, we cannot claim that c 2 = c 5 = 0, but we still have c 0 = a τ γ u τ ,z . We can proceed by asking for the second-order derivative of F(x) = n i=0 a i x u i , which we define as
where z ⊗ z is the k×k matrix defined by (z ⊗ z) ij = z i z j . For example, when P( 
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The final protocol is as follows:
Note that privacy is maintained and the communication is O(k 2 ) = n o(1) , as before. For recovery, define g(T ) ∈ R[T ] as before and note that, in addition to the identities
we also get the second-order derivative of g from
where the inner product of matrices is taken entrywise and using the identity u ⊗ u, v ⊗ v = u, v 2 . By choosing t 1 = 0, t 2 = 1, we have the following matrix equation: 
det(M) = 4γ 3 (γ − 1) 9 = 4 + 2γ 3 = 0; thus, we can use recover a τ , as before.
GENERALIZATION TO MORE SERVERS: PROOF OF THEOREM 1.3
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1.3. We will allow the database symbols to belong to a slightly larger alphabet Z m . Let q = 2 r−1 denote the number of servers S 1 , . . . , S q for some r ≥ 2. Let m = p 1 p 2 · · · p r , where p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p r are distinct primes. By Theorem 2.6, there is an explicit S-matching vector family F = (U, V) of size n and dimension k = n O((log log n/ log n)
The Protocol. We will work over the ring
where U = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) are given by the matching vector family F = (U, V To prove Lemma 6.1, we will need the following simple number-theoretic lemma. Recall that the order of an element a in a finite multiplicative group G is the smallest integer w ≥ 1 so that a w = 1.
LEMMA 6.2. Let F p be a field of prime order p and let k ≥ 1 be an integer co-prime to p. Then, the algebraic closure of F p contains an element ζ of order k.
PROOF. Since k, p are co-prime, p ∈ Z * k which is the multiplicative group of invertible elements in Z k . Let w ≥ 1 be the order of p in the group Z * k ; thus, k divides p w − 1. Consider the extension field F p w , which is a subfield of the algebraic closure of F p . The multiplicative group F * p w of this field is a cyclic group of size p w − 1. Since k divides this size, there must be an element in F p w of order k.
Proof of Lemma 6.1
For any λ = [α 1 , β 1 , . . . , α q , β q ] ∈ R 2q , we can define a function h : S ∪ {0} → R as:
Our goal is then to construct an h of this form such that 
where we recall that R p i ,m = Z p i [γ ]/(γ m − 1). Therefore, we also get that, for a formal variable x, the rings of univariate polynomials also satisfy
In other words, any family of polynomials f i ∈ R p i ,m [x] , i ∈ [r] can be "lifted" to a single polynomial f ∈ R [x] so that ( f mod p i ) = f i for all i (reducing f mod p i is done coordinate-wise). Moreover, since this lift is done coefficient-wise (using Equation (3)), we get that the degree of f is equal to the maximum of the degrees of the f i s. We begin by constructing, for each i ∈ [r], the following polynomial f i (x) ∈ R p i ,m [x] :
The degree of f i is 2 r−1 − 1 = q − 1; thus, by this comment, we can find a polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] of degree q − 1 such that f (x) ≡ f i (x) mod p i for all i ∈ [r]. Define α i , i ∈ [q] to be the coefficients of the polynomial f so that f (x) = q i=1 α i x i−1 . Since we defined t i = i − 1, we have that f (x) = derivatives of g are equal to the first-order derivative and we get repeated rows in the coefficient matrix M (Equation (1)).
All the known PIR schemes are single round; it is an interesting open problem to see if interaction can decrease the cost.
